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Behavioral Advertising:
From One-Sided Chicken to
Informational Norms
Richard Warner* and Robert H. Sloan*
ABSTRACT

When you download the free audio recording software from
Audacity, you agree that Audacity may collect your information and
use it to send you advertising. Billions of such pay-with-data
exchanges feed information daily to a massive advertising ecosystem
that tailors website advertising as closely as possible to individual
interests. The vast majority of consumers want considerably more
control over our information. Consumers nonetheless routinely enter
pay-with-data exchanges when we visit CNN.com, use Gmail, or visit
any of a vast number of other websites. Why? And, what, if anything,
should we do about it? We answer both questions by describing
pay-with-data exchanges as a game of Chicken that we play over and
over with sellers under conditions that guarantee we will always lose.
Chicken is traditionallyplayed with cars. Two drivers at opposite ends
of a road drive toward each other at high speed. The first to swerve
loses. We play a similar game with advertisers, with one crucial
difference: we know in advance that the advertiserswill never "swerve."
In classic Chicken with cars, the players' preferences mirror
each other. When Phil and Phoebe face each other in their cars, Phil's
first choice is that Phoebe swerve first. His second choice is that they
swerve simultaneously. Mutual cowardice is better than a collision.
Unilateralcowardice is too, so third place goes to his swerving before
Phoebe does. Collision ranks last. Phoebe's preferences are the same
except that she is in Phil's place and Phil in hers. Change the
preferences a bit, and we have the game we play in pay-with-data
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Visiting Foreign Professor,
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draft.
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exchanges. Phil's preferences are the same, but Phoebe's differ. She
still prefers that Phil swerve first, but collision is in second place.
Given these preferences, Phoebe will never swerve. Phil knows Phoebe
has these preferences, so he knows he has only two options: he swerves,
and she does not; or, neither swerves. Since he prefers the first, he will
swerve. Call this "One-Sided Chicken."
We play One-Sided Chicken when in our website visits, we enter
pay-with-data exchanges. We argue that buyers' preferences parallel
Phil's, while the sellers'parallel"collision second" Phoebe's. We name
the players' choices in this pay-with-datagame "Give In," (the "swerve"
equivalent) and "Demand" (the "do not swerve" equivalent). For
buyers, "Demand"means refusing to use the website unless the seller's
data-collectionpractices conform to the buyer's informational-privacy
preferences. "Give In" means permitting the seller to collect and
process information in accord with whatever information-processing
policy it pursues. For sellers, "Demand"means refusing to alter their
information-processingpractices even when they conflict with a buyer's
preferences. "Give In" means conforming information processing to a
buyer's preferences. We contend that sellers' first preference is to
demand while buyers give in, and that sellers' second preference is the
"collision"in which both sides demand. Such demanding sellers leave
buyers only two options: give in and use the site, or demand and do not
use the site. Since buyers prefer the first option, they will always give
in.
It would be better if buyers were not locked into One-Sided
Chicken. Ideally, informational norms should regulate the flow of
personal information. Informational norms are norms that constrain
the collection, use, and distribution of personal information. We
contend that such norms would ensure free and informed consent to
businesses' use of consumer data.
Unfortunately, pay-with-data
exchanges are one of a number of situations in which rapid advances
in information-processingtechnology have outrun the slow evolution of
norms. We argue that, in a sufficiently competitive market, the needed
norms would arise if we had adequate tracking-prevention
technologies.
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You download the free audio recording software from
Audacity.' Your transaction is like any traditional provision of a
product for free or for a fee, with one difference: you agree that
Audacity may collect your information and use it to send you
advertisements. 2 Billions of such pay-with-data exchanges occur
daily.3 They feed information to a complex advertising ecosystem that
"behavioral advertising."'
for
profiles
individual
constructs
of
consumers' online activities
Behavioral advertising is "the tracking

AUDACITY: FREE AUDIO EDITOR AND RECORDER, http://audacity.sourceforge.net (last
1.
visited Sept. 6, 2012).

(last
Privacy Policy, AUDACITY, http://audacity.sourceforge.net/contact/privacy
2.
visited Sept. 6, 2012).
See Tania Karas, 10 Things Online Data Collectors Won't Say, SMARTMONEY.COM
3.
(Apr. 5, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.smartmoney.com/spend/technology/10-things-online-datacollectors-wont-say- 1333598586287.
See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
4.
Concept of PersonallyIdentifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1852-53 (2011).
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in order to deliver tailored advertising." 5 It merges our digital
footprints into pictures of surprising intrusiveness and accuracy.
Advertisers can determine where you work, how and with whom you
spend your time, and "[w]ith 87% certainty . .. where you'll be next

Thursday at 5:35 p.m."6 The consequence is a startling loss of
informational privacy.
Informational "[p]rivacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others."7 Others now have considerable power to collect, analyze, and
use our information.8
We-most of us-want considerably more
control over our information than the advertising ecosystem allows.9
But we also want the advantages information processing secures:
increased availability of relevant information, increased economic
efficiency, improved security, and personalization of services.1 0 We

5.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/PO85400behavad

report.pdf [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT].
6.

Lucas Mearian, Big Data to Drive a Surveillance Society, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar.

24, 2011, 1:23 PM),
surveillance-society.
7.

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9215033/Big-data-todrive-a

ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (emphasis added).

8.
We do not distinguish between personally identifying information (PII) and non-PII,
because recent advances in de-anonymization ensure that, in many cases, non-PII may in fact
identify individuals. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization
of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 111 (2008);

Schwartz & Solove, supra note 4, at 1814.
9.
This is the most plausible interpretation of over twenty years of studies and surveys
about consumer attitudes toward privacy. For an excellent collection of relevant studies, see The
Economics of Privacy, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-acquistileconomicsprivacy.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). For a useful summary of consumer attitudes in this
regard, see Joshua Gomez et al., Know Privacy, UNIV. CAL. BERKLEY, SCH. OF INFO. (June 1,
2009),
http:/fknowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy FinalReport.pdf.
For discussion and
interpretation, see Richard Warner, Undermined Norms: The Corrosive Effect of Information
Processing Technology on Informational Privacy, 55 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1047-48 (2011) [hereinafter
Undermined Norms].
10.
For a discussion of the advantages (other than personalization of services), see Jerry
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998)
(emphasizing availability of relevant information, increased economic efficiency, and improved
security). For a discussion of consumer willingness to trade privacy for various benefits, see Karl
W. Lendenmann, Consumer Perspectives on Online Advertising-2010, PREFERENCECENTRAL 3
(2010), http://www.preferencecentral.com/consumersurvey/download ("Over half of consumers
surveyed indicated that they prefer relevant targeted online ads as a trade-off for access to free
content."),
and
CHOICESTREAM,
INC., 2006
ChoiceStream Personalization Survey,
(last
http://www.choicestream.com/pdf/ChoiceStreamPersonalizationSurveyResults2006.pdf
visited Sept. 7, 2012) (claiming that only 15 percent of web users would give up personalization
benefits to avoid revealing personal details). But see Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject
Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working
Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1478214 (arguing that the vast majority of
consumers find behavioral advertising unacceptable). The opposing studies illustrate the wellknown truth about surveys: what you ask determines what you get. Still, the most reasonable
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are willing to trade some privacy for some of the advantages, but we
want a better trade-off than the control-depriving one businesses
currently impose on us. Our misgivings are evidently idle, however.
We routinely enter pay-with-data exchanges when we visit CNN.com,
use Gmail, or visit any of a vast number of other websites.11 Why?
And, what should we do about it?
We answer both questions by describing pay-with-data
exchanges as a game of Chicken that we play repeatedly under
Chicken is
conditions that guarantee that we will always lose.
traditionally played with cars. 12 Two drivers speed toward each other;
the first to swerve loses. We play a similar game with sellers, with
one crucial difference: we know in advance that the sellers will never
''swerve." We will call this game "One-Sided Chicken."
How do we escape One-Sided Chicken and regain an
appropriate degree of control over our information? Regaining control
means ensuring ourselves a sufficiently broad ability to give free and
informed consent to information processing; otherwise, we lack
sufficient ability to determine-by and for ourselves-what
information others collect about us, and how they use and distribute
it. Currently, businesses purport to obtain consent through "Notice
The "notice" is the presentation of information
and Choice."13

interpretation of the surveys is that consumers (more or less) reject the current privacy/efficiency
trade-off and want a trade-off that gives them more control over their privacy.
See, e.g., Wendy Schuchart, Google Privacy Policy Changes? Get Over It, IT
11.
KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE (Jan. 27, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/cio/
google-privacy-policy-changes-get-over-it ("Facebook basically knows enough about me to
successfully predict what I'm going to wear tomorrow, yet we all grudgingly accept Zuckerberg's
evil empire and go on with our status updates.").
The 1955 film classic, Rebel Without a Cause, popularized the game of Chicken. In
12.
the film, Jim Stark (James Dean) races Buzz toward a cliff edge; the first to jump out loses.
REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1955). Bertrand Russell popularized the "drive
toward each other" version when he described the mid-twentieth century nuclear brinksmanship
policies of the United States and the Soviet Union as a game of Chicken. See BERTRAND
RUSSELL, COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WARFARE 29-31 (1959). There is a very readable
discussion of the game of chicken in WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 197-201
(1992). Chicken, also known as Hawk-Dove, is a standard game-theory game. See, e.g., KEVIN
LEYTON-BROWN & YOAV SHOHAM, ESSENTIALS OF GAME THEORY: A CONCISE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
INTRODUCTION 29, 80 (2008); MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME
THEORY 16-17 (1994).
For a description and criticism of Notice and Choice, see Comments of The Center
13.
for Digital Democracy & U.S. PIRG, In re A Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and
Policymakers (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyreportframework/0033857839.pdf [hereinafter Center for Digital Democracy Comments]. See also J. Howard Beales III
& Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 112-14 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 815, 822-23 (2000); cf. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1496 (endorsing a limited notice-and-choice regime).
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(typically in a privacy policy and terms-of-use agreement), while the
"choice" is a consumer action (typically using the site, or clicking on an
"I agree" button), which is interpreted as the choice to proceed under
the presented terms.1 4 As we have argued elsewhere and will assume
here, "notice and choice" is clearly inadequate.' 6 It does not ensure
informed consent: people do not read and acquire the information
necessary to make informed choices.1 6 Moreover, it cannot ensure
informed consent; as Daniel Solove and others have emphasized, you
need information about unpredictable future uses of your data to
make an informed choice, and you cannot know what you cannot
know.' 7 Even if it were possible, and even if people made the effort to
be informed, notice and choice should not be the mechanism we use.
There is no reason to think that the combined result of the individual
choices would yield the socially optimal trade-off between privacy and
the goals served by collecting information.' 8
The key to achieving free and informed consent lies instead in
informational norms.19 Informational norms are social norms that
constrain the collection, use, and distribution of personal
information. 20 Such norms explain, for example, why your pharmacist
may inquire about the drugs you are taking but not about whether you
are happy in your marriage.
Norm-governed exchanges not only
implement acceptable trade-offs between informational privacy and
competing goals, but they also ensure that we give free and informed
consent to those trade-offs. 2 1 Unfortunately, rapid advances in
information-processing
technology
have greatly
outpaced the
relatively slow evolution of norms, and lacking norms, we lack any
adequate way to give free and informed consent to acceptable privacy
trade-offs. The right response is to create the necessary norms, and
we will suggest an appropriate norm-generation process.
14. .
See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 824 ("[W]hen a Web site says something about its
data processing practices-even if this statement is vague or reveals poor practice-the visitor to
the site is deemed to be in agreement with these practices so long as she sticks around. This
summary, despite its ironic tone, is no exaggeration.").
15.
See Richard Warner & Robert Sloan, The Undermining Impact of Information
Processingon Informational Privacy, in RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY IN THE XXI CENTURY (Justyna

Balcarczyk ed., 2012) [hereinafter The Undermining Impact of Information Processing];RICHARD
WARNER & ROBERT SLOAN, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: THE CRISIS IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND
INFORMATION SECURITY (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS].

16.
Beales & Muris, supra note 13, at 135.
17.
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
InformationPrivacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1452 (2001).
18.
See The Undermining Impact of Information Processing, supra note 15;
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 15.

19.
20.
21.

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III. C.
See infra Part III.E.
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It may seem to some that all we are doing is offering an
unnecessarily complicated description of a collective action problem.
Collective action problems are situations in which everyone is worse
off if everyone does what he individually prefers to do.2 2 For example,
everyone is better off if (almost) nobody litters, but, in the 1950s,
almost everyone littered, and, as long as almost everyone else did,
everyone preferred littering to taking the time and effort to use waste
Creating the appropriate collective action-almost
receptacles. 23
everyone uses waste receptacles-eliminates littering.24 Is not the
same true of pay-with-data exchanges? Everyone prefers to acquiesce
to pay-with-data information processing as long as everyone else does,
but everyone would be better off with a better trade-off between
privacy and competing concerns. 25 And, like littering, can we not
eliminate the problem through appropriate collective action-a
So why do we need a more
consumer boycott, for example?
complicated description than this?
The advantage of the One-Sided Chicken description is that it
characterizes the preferences of consumers and advertisers in a way
that reveals how we need to alter those preferences to solve the
problem. 26 Solving the problem requires more than merely convincing
buyers to act in concert-more than a mere boycott, for example.
Sellers would almost certainly be likely to respond to such a boycott by
offering information processing more closely tailored to individual
buyers' preferences.2 7 There would, however, be no assurance that the
new trade-off between privacy and business concerns would be socially
optimal. Sellers would make the minimum concessions necessary to
end the boycott expeditiously, and, of course, the concessions might
slowly disappear once the boycott ended. In addition, the privacy
trade-off would still be a take-it-or-leave-it trade-off that sellers
unilaterally impose, not one to which consumers freely give informed
See Katharina Holzinger, The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach (Soc.
22.
Sci. Research Network, Working Paper, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractd=399140 (discussing various definitions of collective action problems). See
generally MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

OF GROUPS (1971).
See EARTHTALK, Litter Trashes the Environment, ABOUT.COM, http://environment.
23.
about.com/od/pollution/allitter.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
See id. But see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
24.
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 353 (1997).
See Schwartz, supranote 13, at 822.
25.
For a general discussion of the usefulness of game theory in analyzing collective
26.
action problems, see Austin Rathe, Is Game Theory a Useful Tool for Collective Action Problems?,
RATHE (June 8, 2011, 5:12 PM), http://www.rathe.co.uk/austin-rathe/2011/6/8/is-game-theory-auseful-tool-for-collective -action-problems.html.
It is unclear how long the personalized, processing would last once the boycott
27.
ended.
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consent. Our One-Sided Chicken analysis shows that, to solve the
problem, we need to create a permanent threat that consumers will
deny access to the data needed for behavioral advertising and thereby
alter preferences in ways that permit buyers to give free and informed
consent to privacy trade-offs. The way to achieve this result, we
contend, is to empower buyers with "do not track" technologies. 28 An
appropriate informational norm will arise as a result. The norm will
ensure that buyers give free and informed consent to acceptable
privacy trade-offs. 29
But are we not still ignoring another possibility? Why bother
with norms? Why not solve the problem with legal regulation that
ensures that buyers give free and informed consent to acceptable
privacy trade-offs? But how are we to implement this suggestion?
Current privacy regulation in the United States is an unsystematic
It fails to define acceptable privacy trade-offs for
patchwork.3 0
pay-with-data exchanges, 3 1 and it has no workable mechanism to
ensure free and informed consent.
As we argued earlier, the
Notice-and-Choice regime currently favored in legal regulation cannot
possibly ensure free and informed consent. We see no reason to think
this will change soon.
Part I provides a brief description of the online advertising
ecosystem. Part II presents the game of Chicken, both the classic
version with cars, and the One-Sided version we currently play in
pay-with-data exchanges. We contend that consumers will remain
trapped in the game unless we can empower them by giving them
choices that the current online advertising system denies them. We
propose to empower consumers with effective "do not track"
technologies. We claim that consumers' use of effective "do not track"
technologies would, in a sufficiently competitive market, result in an
informational norm. In Part III, we explain the relevant notion of an
informational norm.
We also introduce the key concept of a
value-optimal norm. Value-optimal informational norms guarantee
free and informed consent to acceptable trade-offs between
informational privacy and competing concerns. We lack relevant
norms
governing
pay-with-data
informational
value-optimal

28.
See infra Part VI.
29.
For a general discussion of the role of social norms in solving collective action
problems, see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 953-64
(1996).
30.
See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 1-20 (2010); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1-11 (2008);

Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003).
31.
See Undermined Norms, supra note 9; Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 8,
Schwartz & Solove, supra note 4; see also supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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exchanges, and the result is that we lack any viable means to give
adequately free and informed consent to trade-offs between privacy
and competing concerns that businesses unilaterally impose on us in
pay-with-data exchanges. The solution is to generate the necessary
norms. Part IV introduces the standard economic notion of perfect
competition. We show that if consumers have effective "do not track"
technologies, then, under conditions of perfect competition, a
value-optimal informational norm governing pay-with-data exchanges
will arise. Perfect competition is an ideal that real markets only
approximate, and, in Part V, we show how to replicate our
norm-generation result in real markets. We conclude in Part VI with
a very brief consideration of the prospects for developing close to
perfect "do not track" technologies.
I. THE ONLINE ADVERTISING ECOSYSTEM

We present a simplified model of the advertising ecosystem
consisting of just five entities: profilers, advertising agencies,
advertising networks or exchanges, websites that display the
advertisements, and businesses that purchase the advertisements. 32
A single entity may perform more than one role, but we may ignore
that complication for the purposes of this model.
A. A Simple Ecosystem Model
Profilers create profiles that segment buyers into groups in
order to predict their willingness to buy specific types of products and
services. 33 eXelate, for example, has agreements with hundreds of
websites that allow it to collect information about age, sex, ethnicity,
Internet search information, and
marital status, profession,
34
It combines this data with data from
information about sites visited.
35
eXelate explains,
offline sources.
We are capturing billions of deep granular data points ....

We analyze [these data

points] . . . and roll them into specific Targeting Segments . . . . These categorizations

include Demographic data . . . , consumer Interest data gathered from specific site

Models may distinguish several more entities and functions. For example, some
32.
make a subtle distinction between advertising networks and advertising exchanges. See, e.g.,
Data Usage & Control Primer: Best Practices & Definitions, INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU 12
(2010), http://www.iab.net/media/file/data-primer-final.pdf.
See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
33.
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 425, 462-64 (2011).
34.
See Emily Steel, Exploring Ways to Build a Better Consumer Profile, WALL ST. J.,
3
7
Mar. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870 44 104575117972284656374.
html.
See id.
35.
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activity ... (such as parenting and auto enthusiast sites), and deep purchase Intent
data culled from relevant . .. activity on top transactional sites. We further segment and
sub-segment this data into relevant buckets that in many cases drill down to the
36
product and keyword level.

Profiles routinely identify particular individuals, despite frequent
claims to the contrary from practitioners of behavioral advertising. 37
TARGUSinfo, for example, boasts that "[w]ith our authoritative data
and proprietary linking logic, no other company can match our ability
to accurately identify businesses and consumers in real time-helping
you target and recognize your best prospects, even at the moment of
live interaction." 38 The data includes "names, addresses, landline
phone numbers, mobile phone numbers, email addresses, IP addresses
and predictive attributes." 39 The purpose of the profiles is to target
display advertising. 40
A business may create its own display
advertising, or it may outsource that to an advertising agency. 4 1
Advertising exchanges and networks, such as Google's
AdSense, deliver display advertisements to the websites that display
them. 42 When a buyer visits a website, an advertising exchange
combines the buyer's profile with information about his or her current
website activity in order to more precisely target advertisements. 4 3
The exchange then conducts an auction in which businesses bid for the
opportunity to present their targeted advertisements (the whole
process takes milliseconds). 4 4 As one commentator aptly sums up the
situation, "Advertisers bid against each other in real time for the
ability to direct a message at a single Web surfer."45 The goal is to

36.
Rev Share and Rental Pricing Models Bring Accountability to eXelate Data
Exchange Says CEO Zohar, ADEXCHANGER (May 28, 2009, 7:20 AM), http://www.adexchanger.
com/data-exchanges/data-exchange-exelate-zohar.
37.
See Center for Digital Democracy Comments, supra note 13, at 15-20.
TARGUSinfo, On-Demand Scoring, http://www.targusinfo.com/solutions/scoring/on38.
demand-scoring (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
39.
TARGUSinfo, Our Data: Not All Data Is Created Equal, http://www.targusinfo.com/
about/data (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
40.
See Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 4 (2011) ("These profiles allow websites and ISPs
to serve advertisements and other services that are targeted to their customers' interests.").
41.
For examples of advertising agencies, see Epsilon, Strategy & Analytics, http://www.
epsilon.com/analytic-focused-services; Havas Media, Our Group, http://www.havasmedia.com/our
-group; Omnicom Group, National Advertising Agencies, http://www.omnicomgroup.com/our
companies/nationaladvertisingagencies.
42.
See AdSense Basics, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adsense/binlanswer.py?hl=
en&answer-9712 (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
43.
See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 4, at 1851-52.
44.
See id. at 1852.
45.
Garett Sloane, amNY Special Report: New York City's 10 Hottest Tech Startups,
AMNY (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.amny.comlurbanite-1.812039/amny-special-report-new-yorkcity-s-10-hottest-tech-startups-1. 1724369.
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tailor advertisements as closely as possible to the interests of the
buyer receiving them. 46 Datran Media, for example, promises "to
identify who is visiting your Web site, who is being exposed to your
advertisers' campaigns, and who is responding to specific ads.
Real-time reports paint an accurate picture of whom your audience
really is and who is responding to your communications-at the
household level!" 47 The amount of information processed is immense.
Right Media Exchange processes 9 billion advertising purchases
daily; 4 8 MediaMath, 13 billion daily; 49 TARGUSinfo, 62 billion a
year;5 0 and Pubmatic, one hundred thousand per second.5 1 The
number of Google's AdSense transactions is not available, but it is a
network of 1.5 million websites and advertisers. 52 Participation in
AdSense is free for the seller and a route into the advertising
ecosystem for small businesses and free giveaways like Audacity. 53
Widespread participation in the advertising ecosystem makes
it quite difficult for buyers to find websites that will conform to their
privacy preferences. The lack of buyer choice plays a key role in our
characterization of pay-with-data exchanges as a game of One-Sided
Chicken.
B. Buyers' Lack of Choice
Buyers lack choice because, although advertising is
personalized, information processing is not. Information processing
does not vary to conform to the privacy preferences of individual
Efficient information processing requires standardized,
buyers.
automated routines using supercomputing power and advanced
statistical techniques to analyze vast collections of a complex mix of

See Aperture: Audience Measurement, DATRAN MEDIA, http://web.archive.org/web/
46.
20100222080259/http://www.datranmedia.com/aperture/audience-measurement/index.php?
showtype=for-publishers (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
Id.
47.
Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction and Other Relief at 2, In re
48.
Real-time Targeting and Auctioning, Data Profiling Optimization, and Economic Loss to
Consumers and Privacy, F.T.C. (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.centerfordigital
democracy.org/sites/default/files/20100407-FTCfiling.pdf.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
Id.
51.
Helen Leggatt, Google Discloses Size of Its Ad Network, BIZREPORT (May 26, 2010),
52.
http://www.bizreport.com/2010/05/google-discloses-size-of-its-ad-network.html.
AdSense Revenue: Do I Have to Pay to Use AdSense?, GOOGLE, http://support.google.
53.
comladsense/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=32850 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
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data from a variety of online and offline sources. 54 Marketing
objectives-not buyers' privacy preferences-drive the collection,
analysis, and use of vast amounts of diverse types of information.5 5 As
the CEO of the advertising exchange Rocket Fuel notes, the company's
"technology drives results for advertisers by automatically leveraging
massive amounts of internal and third-party external data and
serving only the best impressions in the context of each advertiser's
unique marketing objectives."5 6
Sellers do not tailor their information processing to buyers'
privacy preferences because they do not need to. As we explain in
detail in the next section, the vast majority of buyers acquiesce in
thereby guaranteeing sellers
information-processing practices,
significant advertising revenues. Thus, sellers can easily afford to
ignore the relatively few buyers who refuse to do business with them
unless they adjust their information-processing practices.57 But even
so, shouldn't we expect some sellers to break the mold to win business
That expectation would be
by catering to privacy preferences?
disappointed.5 8 Sellers do not break the mold-not if they rely on
advertising as a significant source of revenue.5 9 Participation in the
ecosystem gives a seller a competitive edge over nonparticipants by

See, e.g., Rocket Fuel CEO John Says Ad Exchanges More Like a Technology
54.
Platform than Media Source, ADExcHANGER (Aug. 24, 2009, 6:07 AM), http://www.adexchanger.
com/ad-networks/rocket-fuel-ad-exchanges.
See id. (describing marketing objectives but not mentioning buyers' privacy
55.
preferences).
Id. (emphasis added).
56.
One study may suggest the opposite. See Sdren Preibusch & Joseph Bonneau, The
57.
Privacy Landscape: Product Differentiation on Data Collection (The Tenth Workshop on the
Econ. of Info. Sec., Working Paper, 2011), available at http://weis2011.econinfosec.org/papers/
The
The%20privacy%201andscape%20-%20Product%20differentiation%20on%20data%20col.pdf.
study shows that when buyers can detect differences in the privacy characteristics of goods and
services, sellers offering roughly homogeneous goods and services try to differentiate themselves
by catering to privacy preferences. Id. at 3. There is no inconsistency with our claims, however.
The study considered only the amount of personal information requested for registration (if any)
in mandatory or optional fields and whether the website had a privacy policy. Id. at 5. The study
did not "include technical data collected implicitly such as a users' IP address or stored thirdparty cookies." Id. Since such information is critical for behavioral advertising, we cannot infer
from the study that websites would differentiate with regard to such data (even if visitors were
able to detect whether the website collected it).
See Felicia Williams, Internet Privacy Policies: A Composite Index for Measuring
58.
Compliance to the Fair Information Principles, F.T.C. (2006), http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/behavioraladvertising/071010feliciawilliams.pdf ("The vast majority of the privacy
policies stated the firms have the right to share any data with any third party for any reason.").
Not all sellers do. Dropbox's revenue model, for example, relies on user fees for data
59.
storage to generate revenue. See 10 Revenue Models for Social Media Startups,
STARTUPFREAK (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.startupfreak.com/10-revenue-models-for-socialmedia-startups.
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making it a more attractive advertising platform.6 0 To compete, other
sellers must also participate, and, to gain an edge, they may need to
adopt even more privacy-invasive practices. The result is a "race to
the bottom." 61
II. THE GAME OF CHICKEN
We characterize Chicken, in both its classic and One-Sided
Our
forms, by describing the preferences of the players.
characterization of the preferences for One-Sided Chicken shows what
needs to be changed to escape that game.

A. Classic and One-Sided Chicken
In classic Chicken with cars, the players' preferences are
mirror images of each other. Imagine, for example, Phil and Phoebe
face each other in their cars. Phil's first choice is that Phoebe swerve
first. His second choice is that they swerve simultaneously; mutual
cowardice is better than a collision. Unilateral cowardice is preferable
to a collision, as well, so Phil's third place choice is to swerve before
Phoebe does. Collision ranks last. Phoebe's preferences are the same
as Phil's, except that she is in Phil's place and Phil in hers.
Change the preferences a bit, and we have the game we play in
Phil's preferences are the same, but
pay-with-data exchanges.
Phoebe's differ. She still prefers that Phil swerve first, but collision is
To
in second place, before any scenario in which she swerves.
was
Phoebe
suppose
introduce a theme to which we will return,
recently jilted by her lover; as a result, her first choice is to make her
male opponent reveal his cowardice by swerving first, but her second
choice is a collision that will kill him and her broken-hearted self.
Phil knows
Given these preferences, Phoebe will never swerve.
Phoebe has these preferences, so he knows he has only two options: he
swerves, and she does not, or neither swerves. Since he prefers the
62
first option, he will swerve. Call this game "One-Sided Chicken."

A Race to the Bottom: Privacy Ranking of Internet Service Companies, PRIVACY INT'L
60.
(June 9, 2007), http://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/a-race-to-the-bottom-privacy-ranking
-of-internet-service-companies/a-consultation-report-0.
61.
Id.
See EVELYN C. FINK ET AL., GAME THEORY TOPICS: INCOMPLETE INFORMATION,
62.
REPEATED GAMES AND N-PLAYER GAMES 14 (1998). Poundstone discusses feigning to have the

preferences of collision-second Phoebe as a strategy for classic Chicken. See POUNDSTONE, supra
note 12, at 197-201. To the best of our knowledge, very little has been written about One-Sided
Chicken, perhaps because it is such a simple game with just one Nash equilibrium, and that one
being a pure-strategy equilibrium. Discussions of Chicken itself are not uncommon. See, e.g.,
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B. Pay-With-DataExchanges as One-Sided Chicken
Buyers play One-Sided Chicken when we enter pay-with-data
exchanges. We argue that buyers' preferences parallel Phil's while the
sellers' preferences parallel heart-broken, "collision-second" Phoebe's.
We name the players' choices in this pay-with-data game "Give In"
(the "swerve" equivalent) and "Demand" (the "do not swerve"
equivalent). For buyers, "Demand" means refusing to use the website
unless the seller's data-collection practices conform to the buyer's
informational-privacy preferences. "Give In" means permitting the
seller to collect and process information in accord with whatever
information-processing policy it pursues.
For sellers, "Demand"
means refusing to alter their information-processing practices even
when they conflict with a buyer's preferences.
"Give In" means
conforming information processing to a buyer's preferences.
We
contend that sellers' first preference is to demand while buyers give in,
and that sellers' second preference is the "collision" equivalent, in
which both sides demand. Such demanding sellers leave buyers only
two options: give in and use the site, or demand and do not. Since
buyers prefer the first option, they always give in.
1. Buyers' Preferences
Buyers' preferences parallel Phil's. A buyer's first choice is to
demand and have the seller gives in-"(Demand, Give In)" for short.
We will use this short form from now on, and will always understand
"(buyer action, seller action)" to be the order. (Demand, Give In) is the
buyer's first choice because it means that the buyer is sure to receive
information processing consistent with his or her preferences.
The buyer's second choice is (Give In, Give In). The buyer gets
two things: preference-conforming information processing and a
certain attitude-"I insist on conformity to my standards." A buyer
might very well prefer the "I insist" attitude to the "I will conform if
need be" attitude of (Give In, Give In). However, it is possible for
(Give In, Give In) to tie with (Demand, Give in) for first place. Some
buyers may be equally happy with (Give In, Give In) because it also
ensures that the sellers' information-processing practices are
consistent with the buyer's requirements.
Now we turn to the remaining two options: (Give In, Demand)
and (Demand, Demand). Both of these options certainly rank below
the first two options, where the seller gives in, because the first two

Vinod K. Aggarwal & C6dric Dupont, Goods, Games, and Institutions, 20 INT'L POL. Scl. REV.
393, 398-402 (1999).
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options provide the buyer with the use of the website along with
information processing consistent with the buyer's preferences, while
neither of the two remaining options provides both. Buyers prefer
(Give In, Demand) to (Demand, Demand) because the latter means the
buyer is not allowed to use the site (although the seller also is not able
to process the information). Buyers' behavior-entering billions of
pay-with-data transactions daily with sellers who participate in the
advertising ecosystem and give buyers no control over information
processing-shows that buyers prefer to permit the information
processing rather than forego use of the website. 63
In summary, the buyer's preferences are: (Demand, Give In)
either preferred to or tied with (Give In, Give In), which is preferred to
(Give In, Demand), all of which are preferred to (Demand, Demand).
But what about buyers who are unaware of the advertising
ecosystem and the information processing involved? We assume their
preferences do not differ greatly from the buyers who are aware of the
information processing, and hence that, if they realized their beliefs
were mistaken, most of them would most likely join the ranks of the
majority of buyers and continue to enter the same transactions. In
this "if they were not mistaken" sense, we can say they too prefer to
acquiesce to the current information-processing practices of sellers.
Our answer is the same for those who think that "do not track"
Cookie-blocking and other
technologies curtail data collection.
anti-tracking technologies are currently remarkably ineffective,64 and
we assume that if their users were to realize this, most of them would
join the majority in acquiescing to data collection.
2. Sellers' Preferences
Sellers' preferences parallel those of "prefer collision second"
Phoebe. First place goes to (Give In, Demand), which ensures that the
buyers permit whatever information processing the seller desires.
Like "prefer collision
(Demand, Demand) occupies second place.
second" Phoebe, sellers do not "swerve." Why? The question arises
because sellers lose money when they refuse to accommodate the
privacy preferences of "Demanders." However, sellers build buyer

See Kang, supra note 10, at 1218.
63.
See, e.g., Center for Digital Democracy Comments, supra note 13; Bil Corry & Andy
64.
Steingruebl, Where is the Comprehensive Online Privacy Framework? (W3C Workshop on Web
Tracking and User Privacy, Position Paper, 2011), available at http://www.w3.org/2011/trackprivacy/papers/Paypal.pdf; Vincent Toubiana & Helen Nissenbaum, Content Based Do Not Track
Mechanism (W3C Workshop on Web Tracking and User Privacy, Position Paper, 2011), available
at http://www.w3.org/2011/track-privacy/papers/Nissenbaum.pdf.
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refusal into their information-processing practices.6 5 The information
processing involves standardized, automated routines designed to
meet marketing goals, not to conform to buyers' varying privacy
preferences. 66 A seller plays many--often millions-of games with
buyers each day.67 During any span of time, the seller believes enough
buyers will give in to make one-size-fits-all information processing the
profit-maximizing strategy. So in any particular game of Chicken, the
seller's preference ranking is (Give In, Demand) and then (Demand,
Demand).
We doubt that sellers have any clear preference between (Give
In, Give In) and (Demand, Give In). Both options mean pursuing an
information-processing policy consistent with a buyer's preferences,
and both options are irrelevant to what sellers choose to do. Buyers
will either "Demand" or "Give In," and in either case, sellers will opt
for "Demand."68
3. One-Sided Chicken
Combine
buyers'
Phil-like
preferences
with
sellers'
collision-second Phoebe-like preferences, and you get a game of
One-Sided Chicken 69 in which buyers always lose. This is not to claim
that all buyers realize the situation they are in. Some buyers naively
assume that the sellers' information processing is more or less in line
with the buyers' privacy preferences. 70 Such buyers ignorantly
acquiesce to information processing that is almost certainly
65.
See Undermined Norms, supra note 9, at 1074.
66.
See Solove, supra note 17, at 1403-04.
67.
A game theorist might expect that the repeated nature of these pay-with-data
exchanges would necessitate the use of the theory of repeated games from game theory, rather
than the stage games (i.e., one-shot games) we have been using here. See, e.g., FINK ET AL., supra
note 62, at 32-46; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 133-36. However, because of the
extremely simple structure of One-Sided Chicken and of its one equilibrium, there are no
interesting features of repeated One-Sided Chicken that are not already present in the one-shot
One-Sided Chicken we consider, so we can restrict our attention to the simpler case of the
one-shot game. The same would not be true for classic Chicken. See infra text accompanying note
51.
We could put even fewer constraints on preferences, and we would still get the same
68.
result for One-Sided Chicken. As long as seller/Phoebe (1) prefers (Demand, Demand) to
(Demand, Give In) and (2) prefers (Give In, Demand) to (Give In, Give In), then she has a
"dominant strategy" and will always play Demand.
69.
Another related model of website advertising as a game leads to the same (Give In,
Demand) outcome: classic Chicken, but with the moves made sequentially rather than
simultaneously, with Phoebe/seller making the first move. If in classic Chicken, first one player
chooses a move, with the second player having complete information about which move was
chosen, and only then the second player chooses his move, then the one equilibrium strategy is
for the first player to Demand and the second to Give In. See e.g., FINK ET AL, supra note 62, at
11-12.
70.

See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
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inconsistent with their preferences; they give in without realizing it.
Defense requires knowledge, but as soon as buyers acquire the
requisite knowledge, they must lose the game. The knowledge reduces
the buyer's options to two: (Give In, Demand) and (Demand, Demand).
Since the buyer prefers the first option to the second, the buyer always
gives in.
How do we escape One-Sided Chicken to enjoy appropriate
informational norms? Chicken with cars contains a clue. In a 1950s
B-grade Hollywood youth movie, Phil would introduce broken-hearted
Phoebe to just-moved-to-town Tony. They would fall in love, and, in a
key dramatic turning point, Phil and Phoebe would play Chicken.
Phoebe would see that Tony is also in the car with Phil and would be
We need a "Tony" to change businesses'
the first to swerve.
We contend that consumers would become the
preferences.
pay-with-data-exchange equivalent of Tony if they had close-to-perfect
tracking-prevention technologies. Phoebe swerves because she does
Sellers are "in love" with
not want to lose her beloved Tony.
advertising revenue. We argue that sellers will "swerve" to avoid
losing the revenue they lose when buyers prevent data collection for
advertising purposes, and we contend that, in a sufficiently
competitive market, the result will be that an informational norm
arises that implements a trade-off between informational privacy and
competing concerns.
The first step is to introduce and explain norms.
III. NORMS, COORDINATION NORMS, INFORMATIONAL NORMS
We define norms in general first and then turn to the special
Finally, we focus on the type of
case of coordination norms.
coordination norm that concerns us here: informational norms.7 1
A. Norms Generally
We define norms in terms of nearly complete conformity. A
"norm" is a behavioral regularity in a group, where the regularity
exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks that he ought to
conform to the regularity. 72 We leave open the question of how many

We discuss these matters in detail in UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 15. There
71.
are earlier discussions in Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk
Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 45; The
Undermining Impact of Information Processing, supra note 15. In the text we offer a brief
summary.
Our notion of a norm is a standard one in recent law and economics literature, with
72.
one exception. We explain conformity to the norm by appeal to people's beliefs above what they
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must conform for almost everyone in a particular group to conform, as
well as the question of how to define the group within which
conformity occurs ("almost everyone" means "almost everyone in
such-and-such group"). An example: In Jones's small town, everyone
goes to a Protestant church on Sunday. They do so at least in part
because each believes he or she ought to go.
B. CoordinationNorms
Our primary concern is with coordination norms.
A
coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, where the
regularity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks that,
in order to realize a shared interest, she ought to conform to the
regularity, as long as everyone else does. 73 The key difference from
the Protestant church example is that there is a shared interest people
can realize only through coordinated action. This is not true of the
church example: people can attend church even if others do not.
Driving on the right is a classic example. In the United States and
other "drive on the right" countries, we drive on the right because, and
only as long as, almost everyone else does so. 7 4 No one would drive on
the right if she expected everybody else to drive on the left. Which
side of the road one drives on depends on where one expects others to
drive. However, everyone thinks that, for safety and convenience, all

ought to do. The recent literature in contrast explains conformity as the result of self-interested
actors avoiding the costs of nonconformity. "[One] approach typically assumes that people care
only about their own (material) well being, and rely on repeated game models to explain how
they cooperate or refrain from violating social norms. . . . [A] second approach typically assumes
that people care about something else aside from material goods-esteem, or status, or
conformity, or some such thing." Eric A. Posner, Introduction to SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL
SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW xi-xii (Eric A. Posner ed., 2007). Richard McAdams, a proponent of the
second approach, notes that "by norm I mean a decentralized behavioral standard that
individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow . . . [to gain the esteem of others], or
because the obligation is internalized, or both." Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, in SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW 101, 144 (Eric

A. Posner ed., 2007). The emphasis on "feeling obligated" would appear close to our view that
people conform because they think they ought to; however, McAdams explains "feeling obligated"
in terms of the costs of non-conformity-thus: "Without internalization, one obeys the norm to
avoid external sanctions. . . . After internalization, there is yet another cost to violating a norm:
guilt. The individual feels psychological discomfort whether or not others detect her violation."
Id. McAdams still conceives of people as self-interested agents seeking to avoid costs they regard
as unacceptable. We take it to be clear that people are not merely self-interested agents. The
assumption that they are has been extensively and decisively criticized. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN,
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 32-33 (2009).
73.
See UnderminedNorms, supra note 9, at 1060.
74.
H. Peyton Young, The Economics of Convention, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 107-08
(1996) (providing a game-theoretic explanation of the decision made by individual drivers as to
whether to drive on the right or left side of the road).
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drivers should drive on the same side. One cannot achieve this goal
alone; one needs the cooperation of others.
Similarly, in elevator etiquette, the norm is to maximize the
The norm balances two
distance to your nearest neighbor.7 5
competing interests: using the elevator when it arrives, and avoiding
overcrowding. All share an interest in being able to use the elevator
and avoiding overcrowding, and no one can realize the interest
We think we ought to conform to achieve this
unilaterally.
balance-as long as everyone else does so. There is little point in
being a "nearest-neighbor distance maximizer" if everyone else just
stands wherever they like.
In both examples, everyone conforms to the regularity (driving
on the right, maximizing distance from the nearest neighbor) because
everyone thinks that, to realize the shared interest, he or she ought to
conform, as long as everyone else does. We define coordination norms
with reference to this "shared interest/ought to conform, as long as
The "ought" is conditioned on the
everyone else does" pattern.
assumption about everyone else. We will need to refer to such
"oughts" frequently, and, to avoid constant repetitions of "as long as
everyone else does," we will say, for short, that one thinks one ought
conditionally to conform.7 6
We focus on the role of coordination norms in mass markets.
In mass markets, coordination norms shape buyers' demands. A
mass-market buyer cannot unilaterally ensure that sellers will
conform to his or her requirements; coordination norms create
collective demands to which profit-motive-driven sellers respond. One
key question: Who are the parties subject to demand-unifying norms
in mass markets? The answer may at first seem obvious: buyers and
sellers. After all, they need to coordinate so that sellers supply what
buyers demand; and, if the norms are to allocate risks between buyers
and sellers, how could both not be parties to the norm? However,
while it is possible to model mass-market demand-unifying norms as

This is a simplification. The true norm is closer to "maximize the distance from your
75.
nearest neighbor subject to the constraint that you stay within the peripheral vision of at least
one other passenger, and that you have at least one other passenger within your peripheral
vision." See generally Where we stand in an elevator, YOU THE USER (Apr. 26 2012),
http://youtheuser.com/2012/04/26/where-we-stand-in-an-elevator.
Our notion shares similarities with the notion proposed in STEVEN A. HETCHER,
76.
NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (2004). There are also important affinities between our notion of a
coordination norm and the notion of a coordination game. The original idea of coordination
games and the term "coordination game" comes from DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969); Lewis's notion of a convention, in turn, is inspired by THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). For a more recent treatment, see RUSSELL W.
COOPER, COORDINATION GAMES: COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MACROECONOMICS (1999).
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buyer-seller coordination norms, 7 it is simpler and more elegant to

model them as norms to which the only parties are buyers. The key
point is that producers design and sell mass-market products in
response to sufficiently large groups of buyers.
Hence, no
mass-market buyer can unilaterally ensure, for example, that his
desired level of privacy will be available; only a sufficiently large
collective demand can accomplish that.
Coordination via
demand-unifying norms creates the required collective demand, to
which profit-motive-driven sellers respond. Since the profit motive is
sufficient to ensure that sellers respond, there is no need to see the
sellers as a party to the coordination norm. Demand-unifying norms
take the following form: "buyers demand that sellers . . . ."

The

reference to sellers may suggest, contrary to what we said earlier, that
both buyers and sellers are parties to the norm.
This is a
misimpression. Buyers are the only parties subject to the norm. The
norm coordinates their demands, and sellers respond-not because
they are parties to the norm, but because they want to profit by
meeting the unified demand.7 8
C. InformationalNorms
The informational norms with which we are concerned are
coordination norms that govern the collection, use, and distribution of
information.7 9 As Helen Nissenbaum notes, informational norms
[g]enerally ... circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals
that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed. In
medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition or, more
specifically, the patient shares information about his or her physical condition with the
physician but not vice versa; among friends we may pour over romantic entanglements
(our own and those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial
information; with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to
80
discuss work-related goals and the details and quality of performance.

In commercial contexts, informational norms are generally
instances of the following pattern: buyers demand that the seller
collect, use, and distribute information only as is appropriate for that

77.
But see supra text accompanying note 60.
78.
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 120-21
(2004).
79.
Not all informational norms are coordination norms. For example, our
norm-generation process under conditions of perfect competition produces an informational norm
that is not a coordination norm. See infra Part IVB. It is only in real markets that the process
produces a coordination norm. See infra Part V.B. However, since real markets are our ultimate
concern, the informational norms that primarily concern us are coordination norms.
80.
Nissenbaum, supra note 78, at 138.
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The shared interest is that businesses confine
seller's role.8 1
themselves to role-appropriate processing.82 Relying on the work of
Nissenbaum and others, we assume that transactions between
consumers and businesses occur against a background of
informational norms. 83 An example is in order, however.
Imagine Vicki is shopping in a wine store. The relevant norm
is that the store may process information only in ways appropriately
related to the store's role as a retailer of wine. This norm strikes a
balance between privacy and the ends served by information
processing by only permitting the processing of some information and
only for certain purposes. Vicki cannot implement this balance on her
own. A mass-market buyer cannot unilaterally ensure that sellers
will conform to the buyer's requirements; coordination norms create
collective demands to which profit-motive-driven sellers respond.84
Informational norms-like coordination norms generally-play a key
role in mass markets by unifying buyers' demands to the point that
mass-market sellers will meet those demands.85 For example, it is
currently a norm that buyers demand personal computers with a

"Role-appropriateness" is determined contextually. Over a wide range of cases,
81.
group members share a complex set of values that leads them to more or less agree in their
particular contextual judgments of appropriateness. "Within each context, the relevant agents,
the types of information, and transmissions principles combine to shape the governing
informational norms." Michael Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the Theory of
"Contextual Integrity" to Clarify the Privacy Threats of Google's Quest for the Perfect Search
Engine, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 109, 115 (2008). Norms vary from group to group. For simplicity,
however, we take the relevant group to be all US consumers.
This interest in sticking to role-appropriate processing is shared only among buyers,
82.
not buyers and sellers; as we emphasized earlier, our mass-market coordination norms are
buyer-only norms. See supra Part III.B. This is one reason to choose a buyers-only approach to
modeling mass-market coordination norms. We could still model the norms as having buyers and
sellers as parties and make the point about buyers sharing an interest in only role-appropriate
information processing, but the price would be considerable complication.
For a small sample of this diverse literature, see PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC J.D.
83.
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992); MICHAEL PHILIPS, BETWEEN
UNIVERSALISM AND SKEPTICISM: ETHICS AS SOCIAL ARTIFACT (1994); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES
OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:

Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Roger Friedland
& Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional
Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232 (Walter W.

Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Helen Nissenbaum, ProtectingPrivacy in an Information
Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998); James Rachels, Why Privacy
is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1975); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in
Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999); Jeroen van den Hoven, Privacy and the Varieties of
Informational Wrongdoing, in READINGS IN CYBER ETHICS 430 (Richard A. Spinello & Herman T.
Tavani eds., 2001).
See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
84.
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text; infra notes 86-100 and accompanying
85.
text.
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graphical interface. 86 However, if almost all buyers demanded a UNIX
command line interface, mass-market sellers would meet that demand
and ignore the few buyers that want a graphical interface.87
D. Value-Optimal Norms
A cornerstone of our analysis is that coordination norms-and
hence informational norms-may or may not be value-optimal. A
coordination norm is value-optimal when, in light of the values of all
(or almost all) members of the group in which the norm obtains, the
norm is at least as well justified as any alternative. 88 A norm that is
at least as well justified as any alternative is either better justified
than any alternative or is tied with one or more alternatives that are
also better than the rest. This is why it is appropriate to call a norm
"value-optimal" when it is at least as well justified as any alternative:
there is no better alternative. 89 There are many optimality notions;
Pareto optimality is perhaps the most well known. 90 Value-optimality
is the notion for our purposes.
A terminological point: In the
informational-privacy context, we will broaden our use of
"value-optimal" to apply both to informational norms and to trade-offs
between privacy and competing goals. A trade-off is value-optimal
when it is at least as well justified as any alternative.
As we argue below, when value-optimal informational norms
govern mass-market transactions, buyers give free and informed
consent to acceptable trade-offs between informational privacy and
competing concerns.9 1 The concern here is that, in a number of
important cases, rapid advances in information-processing technology
have outstripped the relatively slow evolution of norms and created
novel situations for which we lack relevant value-optimal
86.
See Jeremy Reimer, A History of the GUI, ARS TECHNICA (May 5, 2005, 1:40 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/features/2005/05/gui("It is pretty much assumed whenever anyone sits
down to use a personal computer that it will operate with a graphical user interface. We expect
to interact with it primarily using a mouse, launch programs by clicking on icons, and
manipulate various windows on the screen using graphical controls. But this was not always the
case.").
87.
See supra text accompanying notes 84-98.
88.
To avoid misunderstanding, we should note that we are not, for example, saying
that when you step into an elevator, you explicitly think about where you ought to stand.
Typically, people just unreflectively conform to the norm. The point is that you could justify
conformity if you reflected on the norm under ideal conditions (including having sufficient time,
sufficient information, lack of bias, and so on).
89.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text; infra notes 90-104 and accompanying
text.
90.
A situation is Pareto optimal when, and only when, it is not possible to improve the
well-being of any one person without making others worse off.
91.
See infra Part III.E-F.
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informational norms. There are two ways in which value-optimal
norms may be lacking: (1) relevant norms exist, but they are not
The
value-optimal; or (2) relevant norms do not exist at all.
consequence is the same in each situation: we lack any effective
mechanism to give free and informed consent. Instead, we submit to
poor trade-offs between privacy and competing goals. Behavioral
advertising is an instance of the second type of case; they lack the
relevant norms altogether. We have discussed the "norms but not
value-optimal" cases in detail elsewhere. 92
Before we turn to the lack of norms for behavioral advertising,
it is important to understand what buyers are missing when the
transactions they enter are not governed by value-optimal norms.
Accordingly, we first explain how value-optimal informational norms
ensure free and informed consent to acceptable trade-offs.
E. Norms and Consent
We need to answer three questions about exchanges governed
by value-optimal informational norms: (1) Why are the trade-offs the
norms implement acceptable to buyers? (2) In what sense is consent
to the trade-offs "informed"? And, (3) in what sense is consent "free"?
Information processing
The first question is easy to answer.
consistent with a value-optimal norm implements a trade-off that is
acceptable in the sense that it is justified by buyers' values, and there
is no alternative that is better justified. The answer to the second
question requires a bit more elaboration.
A natural first response is that informed consent requires
awareness of the ways in which the information will be used. This
will not do, however. Current information-processing practices store
data for very long times for later use in ways that are unpredictable at
the time a buyer consents to the data collection. 93 Therefore, the
buyer's consent cannot be informed if being informed means being

An example of a norm that is not value-optimal is the "no helmet" norm among
92.
pre-1979 National Hockey League players. Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed
Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 381, 381 (1973). In 1979, the League mandated wearing helmets. Id. Prior to that time,
not wearing a helmet was a behavioral regularity that existed in part because each player
thought he ought to conform, as long as all the others did-primarily to appear tough, and
secondarily to have slightly better peripheral vision. Id. However, because of the value they
placed on avoiding head injuries, virtually all the players regarded the alternative in which they
all wore helmets as better justified. Id. However, they remained trapped in the suboptimal norm.
Id. We argued elsewhere that the same happens with informational privacy. Id. Our most recent
and complete argument is in UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 15. An earlier, shorter
argument is in UnderminingImpact of Information Processing,supra note 15.
See Solove, supranote 17.
93.
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aware of how the data will be used. The options are either to conclude
that consent cannot be informed or to seek another understanding of
what it means for consent to be informed. We choose the latter course.
We will regard consent as informed provided the buyer knows that the
consent is to practices governed by a value-optimal norm. To know
that the practices are governed by a value-optimal norm is to know
that norm-consistent uses of the buyer's information-both uses now
and uses, whatever they may be, in the unpredictable future-will
implement trade-offs between privacy and competing goals that are, in
light of the buyer's values, at least as well justified as any alternative.
Explaining why consent counts as free is more problematic
than explaining why it counts as informed. Consider Vicki. As a
practical matter, she cannot avoid consenting to the norm-imposed
trade-off. Of course, she could simply not buy wine at all, but she
enjoys wine and is not willing to give it up, nor is she willing to spend
time and effort investigating the exact information-processing
practices of the local wine stores. She is already committed to a
variety of goals-raising her children, pursuing her career, enjoying
her friends, and so on-and the time she is willing to allot to buying
wine is relatively brief. Acquiescing to norm-permitted information
processing is her only viable option. So how can her consent be free?
Are constrained choices after all the example par excellence of
unfree choices? When a thief, with a gun to your head, demands,
"Your money or your life!" the thief violates your freedom by
compelling your choice. The only meaningful option is to hand over
your
money.
There
is
no
gun
to
the
head
in
informational-norm-governed transactions, but options are, in
practice, typically reduced to one-conform to the norm. Does the lack
of options not entail a lack of freedom?
The answer lies in the fact that even a highly constrained
choice can still be a free choice. Imagine, for example, that you have
your heart set on a vacation in the Cayman Islands; unfortunately,
your tight budget appears to make the trip impossible. Your solution
is to constrain your choices by opting for an "all inclusive" vacation
package that offers airfare, hotel, and food for a single affordable
price. In doing so, you voluntarily constrain your food options in order
to freely realize your vacation goal, and, when you eat the hotel food,
you do so as an essential means to realizing your vacation goal and
hence as something fully justified in light of your values. Your
constrained choice is free in the sense that it is a fully justified
component of a freely chosen overall plan. Contrast the thief example.
Giving the money to the thief is not a fully justified part of your
overall plan; it is an unjustified interference with it.
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Similar analysis holds for Vicki's wine-store transaction. She
allots only a relatively small amount of time to purchasing wine. She
wants to purchase suitable wine within that time and return to
pursuing her other goals. She knows the store will process some
range of personal information, and she wants an acceptable trade-off
between her informational privacy and the various interests served by
The wine-store norm-processing
processing the information.
personal information only in ways appropriately related to the store's
role as a seller of wine-offers her a ready-made trade-off, and, as long
as the norm is value-optimal, the trade-off is not only justified in light
of her values, but there is also no alternative that is better justified.
We conclude that, when buyers conform to value-optimal
the
consent to
and informed
give
free
norms, buyers
norm-implemented trade-offs. When we take value-optimal norms
away from mass-market buyer/seller exchanges, we lose the
background that ensures free and informed consent to acceptable
trade-offs.
The problem that concerns us is that relevant
value-optimal coordination norms do not exist for pay-with-data
exchanges. We first argue that the norms do not exist, and we then
turn to explaining how to create the necessary value-optimal norms.
F. Lack of Norms for Pay- With-Data Exchanges
The argument that pay-with-data exchanges lack norms turns
on the definition of coordination norms as regularities to which the
parties to the norm coordinate to realize a shared interest. 94 The
shared interest in the case of informational norms is that sellers limit
themselves to role-appropriate information processing.9 5 We claim
that relevant informational norms do not exist for pay-with-data
exchanges because we lack widely shared notions of role-appropriate
information processing for such exchanges. An analogy shows why.
Suppose that, unbeknownst to each other, two long-time
friends have become expert chess players. When they begin to play
friendly games together, they at first have no norms that govern how
they will use their chess-playing powers against each other. How
should they deal with victory and defeat? Should the victor be
reassuring or taunting? In a losing position, how long should one
struggle hoping for an error before acknowledging defeat and
resigning? They lack shared conceptions of role-appropriate behavior
as chess players. As they play, those conceptions and the associated

94.
95.

See supraPart III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
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coordination norms develop, but they do not exist at first. They arise
over time out of repeated interactions.
We are in a similar situation with pay-with-data exchanges.
The newly acquired power is the vastly increased ability to process
information, and we lack relevant shared conceptions
of
role-appropriateness. These conceptions will only evolve over time
through patterns of social and commercial interaction. Instead of
shared conceptions of appropriateness, we have the intense
controversy that surrounds behavioral advertising today. As we noted
earlier, buyers are willing to trade some privacy for some of the
advantages of permitting extensive information processing, but buyers
want a better trade-off than the one the advertising ecosystem
currently imposes on them.9 6 Any adequate response to behavioral
advertising must strike the proper balance, and as James Rule notes,
"We cannot hope to answer [complex balancing questions] until we
have a way of ascribing weights to the things being balanced. And
that is exactly where parties to privacy debates are most dramatically
at odds."97 We lack shared conceptions of role-appropriate information

processing in many cases,
exchanges.

but in particular

in

pay-with-data

IV. NORM CREATION IN CONDITIONS OF PERFECT COMPETITION

We explain how to create desired norms by first explaining how
to create them under ideal conditions and then explaining how to
approximate the ideal conditions in practice. The ideal conditions in
this case are the conditions of perfect competition. We choose perfect
competition as the ideal because our focus is on the incentive-shaping
effect of coordination norms in mass markets.
A. Perfect Competition
We define competition as perfect when, and only when, six
conditions exist:98
1. Profit-motive-driven sellers.

Businesses seek to maximize

96.

See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.

97.

JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 183 (2007).

98.

Our definition follows a standard pattern. See e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON

&

profit. 99

CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 415 (2012).

99.
See Scott A. Beaulier & Wm. Stewart Mounts, Jr., Asymmetric Information about
Perfect Competition: The Treatment of Perfect Information in Introductory Economics Textbooks,
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2. Lack of market power. Neither sellers nor buyers can
individually control the price or determine the features of a
product or service.10 0
3. Homogeneous products and services. The products and
services involved in pay-with-data exchanges are quite
diverse, but the homogeneity that matters for us is that
The relevant
they are all pay-with-data exchanges.
similarity is in the mechanism of the sale, not the items
sold. The argument we offer works for all pay-with-data
exchanges, no matter what is exchanged, so our references
below to "products and services" are to any particular
product or service involved in a pay-with-data exchange. 101
4. No barriers to entry and exit. Competitors may costlessly
enter and leave the market, and buyers can costlessly
switch from one seller to another.102
5. Zero transactioncosts. Buyers and sellers incur no costs in
carrying out exchanges. 103
6. Perfect information. The perfect information requirement
takes various forms.1 04 Minimally, buyers and sellers know
Most generally, all buyers and sellers are
all prices.
assumed to know everything relevant to their own
production and consumption decisions.1 05 We will use this
broader understanding. For pay-with-data exchanges, we
assume the following: (1) If there is at least one
value-optimal trade-off between the benefits of information
processing and informational privacy, then buyers know
what that trade-off is (and they will prefer it); (2) Buyers
know whether or not a seller's information-processing
practices are consistent with that trade-off; (3) Sellers know
that buyers prefer that trade-off, and they know that
buyers have the knowledge specified in (2).

in EXPANDING TEACHING AND LEARNING HORIZONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC

EDUCATION (Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Richard J. Cebula eds., 2009).
Definitions often substitute the requirement that there be a large number of sellers
100.
and buyers; the point, however, is to make the size of the market sufficient to ensure that no one
seller or buyer has the power to set prices and determine features.
See Beaulier & Mounts, supra note 99, at 211.
101.
102.
See id. at 209.
See NICHOLSON & SNYDER, supra note 98, at 415.
103.
104.
Some definitions of perfect competition omit any mention of perfect information. See
Beaulier & Mounts, supra note 99. We include perfect information in our definition because
appeals to perfect information (and real world approximations to it) play a central explanatory
role for us.
105.
See Beaulier & Mounts, supra note 99.
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B. Norm Creation in Perfectly Competitive Markets with a
Value-Optimal Trade-Off
We assume that buyers and sellers initially play a "seller wins"
game of One-Sided Chicken. We assume also the existence of at least
one value-optimal trade-off between the benefits of information
processing and information privacy. 106 To see how, under these
conditions, a norm among buyers arises, and also how the game
between buyers and sellers changes, consider first that the "[n]o
barriers to entry and exit" assumption ensures that buyers can, at no
cost, switch to sellers who offer the value-optimal trade-off that buyers
prefer. Our perfect-information assumptions guarantee that buyers
can identify the sellers who offer that trade-off. Since buyers prefer
that trade-off, and can identify the sellers who offer it, they will buy
from those sellers-if such sellers exist. 0 7 And those sellers will exist,
as the following considerations show. Sellers know what trade-offs
buyers prefer, and they know that buyers can tell if they offer those
trade-offs.
Hence, sellers know that the best profit-maximizing
strategy is to offer that trade-off. It follows that the sellers will adopt
this strategy (since we assume that they are profit-motive driven).
Sellers will offer the value-optimal trade-off even if they initially did
not do so. The absence of transaction costs and barriers to entry and
exit guarantees that modifying the seller's information processing is
costless, and the lack of market power guarantees that no one can
prevent a seller from beginning to offer the trade-off. Eventually, all
sellers will offer the value-optimal trade-off. The result is that buyers
and sellers are no longer locked in a game of One-Sided Chicken. Both
end up preferring as their first choice the value-optimal trade-off.
The consequence is that the "buyers demand the value-optimal
trade-off' norm will become a behavioral regularity to which buyers
conform because they think they ought to. Indeed, our assumptions
are so strong that demanding the value-optimal trade-off is a norm,
but not a coordination norm; buyers think they ought to demand the

106.
Such a trade-off does not have to exist. It could also be the case that every
individual finds a different trade-off to be the one most in accord with his or her values. Another
possibility is that our values may not pick out an alternative that is at least as well justified as
any alternative. Our evaluative perspectives may sometimes fail to provide complete maps that
guide us through the decisions we must make; they may be sketches leaving large areas barely
filled in, if filled in at all. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, supra note 72. No value-optimal trade-off is
one possibility; multiple such trade-offs is another. For example, everybody might find
Information Processing Policy A coupled with free use of the New York Times's website and
Information Processing Policy B together with a requirement to pay a particular price for use of
the New York Times's website to be equally well justified in light of their values, and both at
least as good as any other alternative.
107.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

2012]

BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING

77

value-optimal trade-off between information processing and other
competing interests independently of other buyers' behavior. It may
seem we have departed from our general form for informational
norms: "buyers demand that sellers process information only in
role-appropriate ways." However, if a seller, in response to buyer
demand, processes information in the buyer-demanded value-optimal
ways, that seller certainly does so to process the information in accord
with a shared conception of role-appropriateness.1 0 8
V. NORM CREATION IN REAL MARKETS

We can replicate these results in real markets to the extent
real markets sufficiently approximate the conditions of perfect
This Article assumes that the markets sufficiently
competition.
approximate all of the conditions except for the perfect-knowledge
condition. This is by no means to suggest that the other assumptions
are not problematic.
They certainly are, but that is a different
problem requiring analysis in the context of competition and antitrust
law. We focus on approximating the perfect information assumption,
and we begin with the obstacles in the way of any approximation.
In the "perfect-markets" argument, we specified the relevant
knowledge by assuming the existence of a value-optimal trade-off
between the benefits of information processing and informational
privacy. We assumed that buyers knew which trade-off that was and
whether a seller offered that trade-off. None of this is true in practice.
To begin with, people do not yet agree on what trade-offs are best
justified. Reaching agreement on this is not like finding buried
treasure. The buried treasure is there whether we find it or not, but
the answers we need about value-optimal trade-offs are not similarly
buried in our values just waiting for us to think long enough and hard
enough to find them. We need to invent them. Our values are not
closed, complete, consistent systems that guide us through the
decisions we must make. Our values are more or less detailed outlines
that may leave large areas barely filled in, and they often incorporate
competing, or outright inconsistent, claims and views, whose weight is
not fixed in advance of our reasoning about the situations in which we
find ourselves. We often need to extend our values to cover new
situations, and rapid advances in information-processing technology
require us to do so now for website advertising.
108.
We can infer role-appropriateness from value-optimality, but the inference does not
work the other way around. Informational norms that are not value-optimal are examples of
role-appropriate information processing that is not value optimal. We discuss such examples in
The Undermining Impact of Information Processing, supra note 15 and UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS,
supra note 15.
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To make matters more difficult, merely creating agreement on
a trade-off may not be enough to solve the problem. Contrary to what
we assumed in the case of perfect competition, buyers knowing what
the trade-off is may not be enough to guarantee that buyers demand
that sellers make that trade-off available to them. The reason is that
advertisers are a significant source of revenue for sellers in markets in
which buyers provide information and receive advertising in exchange
for products and services.1 09 As long as buyers are trapped in "seller
wins" One-Sided Chicken, large and stable advertising revenues will
make sellers unresponsive to demands from small minorities of buyers
to change the sellers' information-processing policies.
In the hypothetical ideal "perfect competition" market, some
seller would meet the information-processing demands of even a small
minority of buyers, because that seller could increase profit by doing
so. However, in the real world, websites such as Facebook, Google,
and the half dozen largest news sites all have great market power,
and any would-be new competitor faces significant barriers to entry. 110
Furthermore, if only a small number of buyers have different
information-processing demands, then the transaction costs of
identifying those buyers might be too great to make it worthwhile to
meet the privacy demands of those buyers.
So, in real markets, even if buyers agree on a value-optimal
trade-off, buyers who want use of such websites will still prefer to
acquiesce to sellers' information-processing practices unless the group
of buyers refusing to do business without a change in those practices
is large enough to compel the seller to alter its practices. The group of
buyers would need to be large enough that the lost business
significantly reduces advertising revenue. This was not a concern in
perfectly competitive markets because every buyer switches to sellers
offering the value-optimal trade-off.
A. A Norm-GenerationProcess
Our
solution
assumes that
every buyer
possesses
close-to-perfect "do not track" technologies. A tracking-prevention
technology would be perfect if it were completely effective in blocking
information processing for advertising purposes, completely
109.
Typical sellers we have in mind are websites such as CNN, Yahoo!, and Craigslist.
See CNN, http://www.cnn.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2012); YAHOO!, http://www.yahoo.com (last
visited Sept. 12, 2012); CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
110.
In fact, the game in the hypothetical world of perfectly competitive markets was not
strictly speaking One-Sided Chicken. One-Sided Chicken is a one-buyer-versus-one-seller game,
but in perfectly competitive markets a buyer plays against a multitude of sellers, all lacking
market power.
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transparent in its effect, effortless to use, and it permitted a user full
use of any website.
We begin with a summary of our proposed norm-generation
process: (1) buyers will use the "do not track" technologies; (2) use of
these technologies will threaten sellers with a dramatic decline in
advertising revenue; (3) sellers will respond by offering buyers
information processing consistent with their preferences; and (4) the
ultimate result will be a collection of value-optimal norms governing
pay-with-data transactions.
1. Buyers Will Use the Technologies
As we noted at the beginning, the vast majority of buyers
greater control over their information than current
wants
information-processing practices allow. We assume that the desire for
control is sufficiently strong that buyers would block tracking if they
had close-to-perfect tracking-prevention technologies. If this turns out
not to be true, it would certainly be necessary to reevaluate the
surveys that report buyers' strong objections to current behavioral
advertising.111
2. Advertising Revenue Will Decline
The result of buyers using close-to-perfect do-not-track
technologies used is a loss of advertising revenue for sellers. Sellers'
advertising revenue is a function of the number of advertisements on
112
The
their websites and the number of responses to them.
attractiveness of a website as an advertising platform depends on the
113
In the online
effectiveness of advertisements on that website.
advertising ecosystem, this effectiveness is a function of the amount
and accuracy of the information collected from the site about
buyers.1 14 When all buyers block the collection of such information,
the effectiveness of advertisements declines, and websites lose a good

&

See supra note 10.
111.
See Omer Tene, Privacy: The New Generations, 1 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 15, 16-17
112.
(2010), available at http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/15.full; see also AdWords Help:
http://support.google.com/adwords/binlanswer.py?hl=en&
GOOGLE,
Bidding,
Cost-per-click
answer=2459326 (last updated Sept. 17, 2012) (discussing the per-click, per-view, and
per-conversion advertisement-bidding processes for the placement of ads on Google's search
result pages, blogs, and ad network).
See Tene, supra note 112, at 16-17.
113.
See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track"- Advancing
114.
Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J. L. ScI.
TECH. 281, 283; FrC STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; Tene, supra note 112, at 16-17.
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deal of their attractiveness as advertising platforms.115 Advertisers
are more likely to spend their advertising budgets elsewhere-on TV,
radio, and print-publication advertisements. Thus, it does not matter
that advertisers are a significant source of revenue. Websites lose
that revenue when they lose their attractiveness as advertising
platforms.
3. Sellers Will Conform More Closely to Buyers' Preferences
Sellers will respond by offering information processing
consistent with buyers' preferences. They will, that is, if they can
segment buyers into groups of shared preferences, and if at least some
of the groups are sufficiently large that the expected profit from
meeting those groups' preferences is greater than the cost of not doing
so. We fully expect buyers to cluster into such groups. Even if they do
not initially, sellers will be able to form such groups of buyers through
Advertising can powerfully shape buyers' demands.
advertising.
Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs is an excellent
example; it has increased the demand for such drugs. 116 Website use
is similar. Accessing websites for all sorts of purposes is now such an
entrenched feature of daily life that not doing so is no longer an
option. Accessing websites has a "side effect," however-the collection
and commercialization of information about buyers. Advertising that
promotes trade-offs between the benefits and the "side effect" should
coalesce buyer demand more or less as well as prescription-drug
advertising. So sellers will conform to buyers' preferences by shaping
those preferences in ways that make conformity profitable. Like
Phoebe when she sees Tony in the car, sellers will "swerve" to avoid
losing the advertising revenue that they "love."
We contend that a collection of norms will arise as a result.
This final conclusion, contemplating whether those norms are truly
value-optimal, merits a separate subsection.
.

B. Norms? Yes. Value-Optimal? Yes, But. .

The result of the process outlined above will be a number of
behavioral regularities of the form, "buyers demand such-and-such
trade-off." Eventually, not only will the trade-offs be value-optimal,
but buyers will also believe they are. Recall that consumers are
currently not even close to consensus about how to strike a
115.
Cf. Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409,
1440 (2011).
Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Demand Effects of Recent Changes in Prescription
116.
DrugPromotion, 6 FRONTIERS HEALTH POL'Y RES. 1 (2003).
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value-optimal trade-off between privacy and the benefits of
information processing. As advertising unites buyer demand into
suitably sized groups, buyers will continue to engage in billions of
pay-with-data exchanges daily. Over time, the trade-offs implemented
in the exchanges will cease to be merely accepted; they will become
Buyers will ultimately recognize the trade-offs as
acceptable.
value-optimal. Buyers' values will have evolved and transformed so
that they regard the trade-offs as at least as well justified as any
alternative. At that point, the regularities will be coordination norms.
Buyers will conform to the regularity because we think we ought to
(our values dictate that we ought), and the "ought" will be conditional.
A buyer thinks she ought to conform only as long as almost all others
do; if almost all others demanded some other trade-off, the buyer
would think she ought conditionally to do so, too. Sellers would not
meet an idiosyncratic demand, so, as long as foregoing the services is
not an acceptable option, the buyer will think she ought to demand the
trade-off conditionally.11 7

So is this not what was wanted? A way out of One-Sided
Chicken that yields value-optimal norms? That depends. We (the
authors) have no doubt that the process will lead to value-optimal
norms, but will it be a process that as a society we will later regret?
What one values in one's youth, as a result of a personality-shaping
factor, one may regret when one is older. The same may happen
society-wide. It is possible, for example, that the process leads to the
world Daniel Solove dreads, the world in which a permanent,
ever-growing, readily searchable trail of information records the
trivial to the intimate to the unfortunate details of our lives from
childhood onward.11 8 How can we avoid such regrettable outcomes?
Our suggestion is to rely on consumer educational initiatives."'
They can powerfully shape buyers' preferences. For example, the
spread of health information has led, over the last twenty years, to a
per capita increase in poultry consumption at the expense of beef
consumption. 120 The explanation presumably is that education altered
Buyers may divide into several groups each with a different opinion about what
117.
trade-off is value-optimal. As long as the groups are large enough (and sellers can identify who
belongs to which group), different coordination norms may arise for each group.
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The Federal Trade Commission's efforts illustrate the type of educational initiatives
119.
we have in mind. Since the rise of e-commerce in 1995, "the Commission has conducted a series
of public workshops and has issued reports focusing on online data collection practices, industry's
self-regulatory efforts, and technological efforts to enhance consumer privacy." FTC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 5.
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the values about health and enjoyment that guide people's food
choices.12 1
Our hope is that consumer education will direct
value formation away from regrettable paths.
VI. PROSPECTS FOR "Do NOT TRACK" TECHNOLOGIES
Our norm-generation argument assumes close-to-perfect
tracking-prevention technologies. Current technologies are very far
from perfect. They are remarkably ineffective, not at all transparent
in effect, daunting for average buyers to use, and may interfere with
the use of websites.1 22 What are the prospects for developing
close-to-perfect technologies? They are not unpromising. At the 2011
W3C Web Tracking and User Privacy Workshop, representatives from
BlueKai, 12 3 Datran Media, 124 Intel, 125 and Microsoft, 126 not only
expressed their willingness to incorporate emerging "do not track"
technologies, they emphasized the importance of doing so.
Considerable controversy remains, however, over what the
technologies should do and how they should do it.127
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Our norm-generation process yields at least a partial criterion
of adequacy for "do not track" technologies: they must give buyers
enough power to prevent data collection in order to make the
norm-generation process work. This is not to say that the technology
alone must confer such power. Empowering buyers may require legal
regulation that requires sellers to accommodate "do not track"
technology instead of trying to circumvent it. Our claim is conditional:
if we can appropriately empower users, relevant value-optimal
informational norms will arise.

